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FBI Rap Sheets-An Invasion of Constitutional Rights?
For several years the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has employed
a system of centralized and computerized national crime records. The FBI
transmits these criminal identification records, commonly called rap sheets,
between local and regional law enforcement agencies and FBI headquar-
ters in Washington, D.C. Recently, courts have begun to scrutinize the
maintenance and accessibility of rap sheets with the initial impression that
these records present serious constitutional questions. This article will focus
attention on two areas: (1) the composition and use of FBI criminal iden-
tification records, and (2) the inherent constitutional questions involved in
their maintenance and availability.
Composition of the FBI Criminal Identification Record
The FBI was first explicitly authorized to maintain a system of criminal rec-
ords in 1930.1 The Division of Identification and Information, which was
established to handle these records, was specifically limited to the acquisition
and preservation of "criminal identification and other crime records."' 2 The
statute states that:
(a) The Attorney General shall-
(1) acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification, crimi-
nal identification, crime, and other records; and
(2) exchange these records with, and for the official use of,
authorized officials of the Federal Government, the States, cities,
and penal and other institutions.
(b) The exchange of records authorized by subsection (a) (2)
of this section is subject to cancellation if dissemination is made out-
side the receiving departments or related agencies.
(c) The Attorney General may appoint officials to perform the
functions authorized by this section.3
The Attorney General recently modified this statute by a regulation which,
in his view, states that, dissemination is not limited to government officials
of one kind or another, since the list of authorized recipients includes govern-
1. Act of June 11, 1930, ch. 455, 46 Stat. 544.
2. id.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
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ment agencies in general, banks, insurance companies, and railroad police.
The regulation reads:
Subject to the general supervision and direction of the Attorney Gen-
eral, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall: . . .
(b) Conduct the acquisition, collection, exchange, classification,
and preservation of identification records, including personal fin-
gerprints voluntarily submitted, on a mutually beneficial basis from
law enforcement and other governmental agencies, railroad police,
national banks, member banks of the Federal Reserve System,
FDIC-Reserve Insured Banks, and banking institutions insured by
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation; provide ex-
pert testimony in Federal or local courts as to fingerprint exami-
nations; and provide identification assistance in disasters and in
missing-persons type cases, including those from insurance compa-
nies. 4
As will be later discussed there is some dispute as to the extent to which
these records can be constitutionally disseminated. The FBI's criminal
files include over 54 million arrest records.5 This information is circulated
to more than 14,500 private and public agencies,6 including the United
States Civil Service Commission, all branches of the Armed Services, 7 and the
California State Bar Examiners.8 One critic has stated that these criminal
bookings are available to credit bureaus, and might even be available to the
press.9  The FBI rap sheet contains the following information: (1) the
agency which contributed the fingerprints, (2) the name and arrest number
of the person taken into custody, (3) the date of arrest, (4) the charge, and
(5) the final disposition of the case. The sheet as illustrated in Appendix
A is divided into five columns headed by one of the preceding categories of
information. There is sufficient space on the sheet to indicate a number of
arrests. Usually, the information is typed on the sheet in abbreviated fash-
ion by the transmitting agency.
After a person is taken into custody and fingerprinted, the above informa-
tion is filled in by the local or regional authorities and sent to FBI headquar-
ters. These same authorities are also responsibile for informing the FBI of
the final disposition of the case if that information does not appear on the
original record. The problem which usually develops and which has created
4. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1970).
5. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COOPERATION, THE BACKBONE OF EFFECTIVE
LAW ENFORCEMENT 12 (1968).
6. Id.
7. Exec. Order No. 10,450, 3 C.F.R. 936 (Comp. 1949-53) (Letter 731-2).
8. See California Board of Bar Examiners Announcement of August 1970 Bar
Exam and attached FBI Fingerprint Card sent to all applicants.
9. NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1970, at 33.
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the recent controversy is the failure of the rap sheets to indicate the final dis-
position of the case. 10 Although the FBI has contended that the lack of
complete information is due to the transmitting authorities failure to notify
them of the final disposition, the FBI may be under some duty to supplement
their files should they obtain information from other sources that exonerate
the person arrested." The courts recognize that while there must be
some limit as to how complete the records must be kept, nevertheless files
which tend to devise classifications that lump the innocent with the guilty
will not be permitted.'
2
A further problem is presented since much of the information found on the
rap sheet is written in somewhat cryptic language, e.g., references to sec-
tions of the state statutes and abbreviations of the crimes. Although the
FBI may have no difficulty in interpreting the references, it is questionable
whether other agencies and individuals who gain access to these records are
capable of understanding their meaning. The simplicity of the rap sheet is
such that further amplification of the references contained in it is necessary
to insure that no misinterpretation of the record occurs. The other alterna-
tive would be to further limit the dissemination of the record to internal uses
by the FBI and othe law enforcement agencies.
Court Attacks on the Constitutionality of the FBI Rap Sheet
In two recent cases, Menard v. Mitchell 3 and United States v. Penney,' 4
two separate courts have launched attacks on the FBI rap sheet and its
dissemination. Although both courts assert that the maintenance of the
FBI rap sheets raises serious constitutional questions, neither explicitly stated
the constitutional provisions violated. The language of these two opinions
10. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Disposition Data Needed for Com-
plete Arrest Record, in LAw ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, April 67, at 3.
11. Cf. Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961). In a five
to four decision the Supreme Court held that it was within the power of the command-
ing officer of a naval gun factory to deny a civilian cook employed in a private con-
cession within the factory access to that factory. Such action was held not a denial
of due process under the fifth amendment, although no other reasons were given for
the exclusion except that the cook was considered a security risk. Justice Brennan
noted in his dissent that in essence the majority would permit a commanding officer to
allow arbitrary and discriminatory actions provided they are not admitted, since the
actions could not be reviewed. See also Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
12. See, e.g., Boorda v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 421 F.2d 1142 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970). The court of appeals held that Sec-
tion 14(a) of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 was violative of the first
amendment since it authorized public disclosure of a person's membership in a Com-
munist-action organization without any finding of illegal activity by that individual.
13. 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
14. Criminal No. 44939 (D.C. Gen. Sess., Nov. 20, 1970).
19701
Catholic University Law Review
implies that the fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments are involved, insofar
as due process and the right to privacy violations exist with regard to the
maintenance and administration of the rap sheets.
In Menard the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit stated that the retention and distribution of records of mere arrests
by the FBI could infringe individual constitutional rights if not properly
handled. 15 Menard instituted suit to compel the Attorney General and
the Director of the FBI to remove (1) his fingerprints and (2) an accom-
panying notation regarding his detention by California police from the FBI's
criminal identification files. The complaint alleged that while Menard was
a student in California he was arrested for burglary, fingerprinted, detained
for two days by the Los Angeles police, but never charged with any crime.
He was then released from custody for lack of evidence. The FBI subse-
quently obtained copies of Menard's fingerprints and other information
placed on a criminal investigation card. While the card did show that Men-
ard had been detained on suspicion of burglary, it failed to indicate his sub-
sequent release. The court in Menard reversed the district court's decision
granting the government's motion for summary judgment and remanded the
case for trial to discover the complex constitutional issues presented.' 0
In its opinion the court recognized the arduous task of the FBI in at-
tempting to keep its information on releases and clearances of suspicion as
meticulously as it keeps its arrest records. 17 The court evidenced a belief
that the FBI may not be justified in maintaining fingerprint files and arrest
records. The court stated:
Realistically, the FBI cannot be expected to investigate the facts
underlying every arrest or detention reported to it; the most it can
do is examine the report on its face and, perhaps, investigate fur-
ther if a complaint is received from the individual concerned. For
most of those arrested-too poor, too ignorant, and often too dis-
hearted to complain-the only adequate remedy may lie either
in severely curtailing any use of records of arrest, or in eliminating
altogether their maintenance in a file associated with the individu-
al's name. 1
8
A major portion of the opinion focused on the possible adverse effects which
such records could have on the individual:
Information denominated a record of arrest, if it becomes known,
may subject an individual to serious difficulties. Even if no direct
15. 430 F.2d at 490-91.
16. Id. at 495.
17. Id. at 492.
18. Id. at 495 n.51.
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economic loss is involved, the injury to an individual's reputation
may be substantial. Economic losses themselves may be both di-
rect and serious. Opportunities for schooling, employment, or
professional licenses may be restricted or nonexistent as a conse-
quence of the mere fact of an arrest, even if followed by acquittal
or complete exoneration of the charges involved. An arrest rec-
ord may be used by the police in determining whether subsequently
to arrest the individual concerned, or whether to exercise their dis-
cretion to bring formal charges against an individual already ar-
rested. Arrest records have been used in deciding whether to al-
low a defendant to present his story without impeachment by prior
convictions, and as a basis for denying release prior to trial or an
appeal; or they may be considered by a judge in determining the
sentence to be given a convicted offender.19
The court implied, however, that many of these effects may be non-existent,
if the dissemination is limited.
20
In a more recent case, United States v. Penney,21 Judge Alexander in
the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions echoed the statements of
the circuit court. Penney, who had no prior record of arrests or convictions,
was arrested on charges of disorderly conduct and assaulting a policeman. The
disorderly conduct charge was never processed, and the government dropped
its case on the charge of assaulting a policeman three days later. Penney,
concerned that his future attempts to find employment, especially with the
government, might be impaired, requested that the record of this arrest be
erased. Judge Alexander assented to this request and issued an order pro-
hibiting the FBI from "distributing, communicating, transmitting or other-
wise making available" any information on Penney's arrest, including finger-
prints or mug shots.22 The Government petitioned the federal district
19. Id. at 490-91.
20. Id. at 492-93.
21. Criminal No. 44939 (D.C. Gen. Sess., Nov. 20, 1970). Although Judge Alexan-
der's action prohibiting the dissemination of Penney's arrest record was essentially a
civil action, the court in Morrow v. District of Columbia, 147 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir.
1969) sanctioned an ancillary civil action in a criminal case:
• . . in a situation such as the one before us, ancillary jurisdiction should at-
tach where: (1) the ancillary matter arises from the same transaction which
was the basis of the main proceeding, or arises during the course of the main
matter . . . (2) the ancillary matter can be determined without a substantial
new fact-finding proceeding; (3) determination of the ancillary matter through
an ancillary order would not deprive a party of a substantial procedural or sub-
stantive right; and (4) the ancillary matter must be settled to protect the
integrity of the main proceeding or to insure that the disposition in the main
proceeding will not be frustrated.
Id. at 740. The Morrow court specifically upheld the expungement of an arrest record
on the theory of ancillary jurisdiction in a criminal case.
22. Criminal No. 44939 (D.C. Gen. Sess., Nov. 20, 1970).
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court for removal of the case from the Court of General Sessions.2 3  This
petition was granted by Judge Gesell, and again Penney sought to gain a
"complete prohibition on future dissemination of the records, proof that they
have been destroyed and list of anyone who received them in the mean-
time."'24  Although Judge Gesell accepted the Government's jurisdictional
argument, the thrust of the decision was simply to afford the FBI an oppor-
tunity to expunge Penney's arrest record.
Despite the fact that the Menard and Penney decisions resulted in the ex-
pungement of their respective arrest records,25 there is no indication of a
change in the FBI's basic policy with regard to the dissemination and use of
the rap sheets. Each person subjected to the rap sheet procedure must there-
fore either accept the procedures as they exist or institute a costly suit to res-
cue his record. In an attempt to rectify this situation in the District of Colum-
bia, Utz v. Wilson,26 a class action, was instituted in the federal district court
23. The petition for removal filed by the Director of the FBI alleged a right to
remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1964), which provides that:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court
against any of the following persons may be removed by them to the district
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
wherein it is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person
acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on account of
any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the
apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.
Penney properly alleged that the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions was
not in fact a state court, but a federal court and that removal was improper.
Penney further alleged that jurisdiction was proper in the District of Columbia Court of
General Sessions since the action was an ancillary proceeding to a criminal action as
sanctioned in Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Peti-
tion to Remand at 6, Civil No. 3472 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 30, 1970). See note 22 supra.
24. Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1970, § A, at 16, col. 5.
25. In many instances the courts have indicated that the use of arrest records
should be limited to law enforcement situations. In In Re Smith, 63 Misc. 2d 198, 310
N.Y.S.2d 617 (Family Ct. 1970), expungement was ordered because there was reason to
doubt that the prohibition on access to police records from private employers was
being rigidly enforced. In United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R. 1967) the
court held: "The preservation of these records is an unwarranted attack upon his
character and reputation and violates his right to privacy." Id. at 970. In State ex
rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 66 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1946) expungement was granted where the
police allowed public disclosure of arrest photographs in a rogues gallery fashion. In
Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968), expungement war ordered after
the court found no probable cause for arrests of hippies. In Wheeler v. Goodman,
306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969), the court stated that expungement was justified
since "extreme circumstances" exist "where records do not serve to protect society,
or their future misuse is likely." Id. at 65. In United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d
Cir. 1932), the court denied expungement because there was careful provision to pre-
vent the misuse of records and there was no charge of any improper use in the present
case. Id. at 70. In McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N.J. Eq. 341, 54 A.2d 469 (1947), the
court took notice of arrest records kept under "lock and key and not subject to public
view." Id. at 471.
26. Utz v. Wilson, Civil No. 4571 (D.D.C. Jan. 1, 1971).
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seeking injuctive relief relying on the Duncan ordinance 27 and constitutional
violations. 28 The class consists of all persons arrested and fingerprinted by
the District of Columbia Police Department since October 31, 1967, the date
the Duncan ordinance was adopted. The class is divided into four sub-
classes pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) :29 (1) persons exonerated of the
charges against them, (2) persons who are defendants in criminal cases but
27. Washington, D.C., Duncan Ordinance, Nov. 2, 1967. The Duncan Ordinance
is based on the REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE EFFECT OF POLICE
ARREST RECORDS ON EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
(1967). It provides:
1. That no record, copy, extract, compilation or statement concerning any
record relating to any juvenile offender or relating to any juvenile with respect
to whom the Metropolitan Police Department retains any record writing, shall
be released to any person for any purpose except as may be provided under
D.C. Code, Section 11-1586; provided, that the release of such information
to members of the Metropolitan Police Department, and the dissemination of
such information by the Metropolitan Police Department, to the police de-
partments of other jurisdictions wherein juveniles apprehended in the District
of Columbia reside, shall be authorized, provided further, that the release of
such information to individuals to whom the information may relate or to the
parents or guardians or duly authorized attorneys of such individuals, shall be
authorized in those cases in which applicants therefor present documents of
apparent authenticity indicating need for such information for reasons other
than employment. The term "employment", in the context of this paragraph,
shall not include military service.
2. That unexpurgated adult arrest records, as provided under D.C. Code,
Section 4-134a, shall be released to law enforcement agents upon request,
without cost and without the authorization of the persons to whom such rec-
ords relate and without any other prerequisite, provided that such law enforce-
ment agents represent that such records are to be used for law enforcement
purposes. The term "law enforcement agent" is limited in this context to per-
sons having cognizance of criminal investigations or of criminal proceedings
directly involving the individuals to whom the requested records relate. The
term includes judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys (with respect to the records
of their client defendants), police officers, Federal agents having the power of
arrest, clerks of courts, penal and probation officers and the like. It
does not include private detectives and investigators; personnel investigators,
directors and officers; private security agents or others who do not ordinarily
participate in the process involving the detection, apprehension, trial or pun-
ishment of criminal offenders.
3. That, subject to the foregoing, adult arrest records, as provided under D.C.
Code, Section 4-134a, shall be released in a form which reveals only en-
tries relating to offenses which have resulted in convictions or forfeitures of
collateral.
4. That, subject to the foregoing, adult arrest records, as provided under D.C.
Code, Section 4-134a, shall be released in a form which reveals only entries
relating to offenses committed not more than 10 years prior to the date upon
which such records are requested; except that, where an offender has been
imprisoned during all or part of the preceding 10-year period, the record
shall include entries relating to such earlier conviction.
28. Complaint for Plaintiffs at 1, Utz v. Wilson, Civil No. 4571 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 1,
1971).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) states:
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
1970]
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awaiting trial, (3) juveniles charged in the District of Columbia Juvenile
Court, and (4) persons who have been adjudged guilty of an offense.
Utz's petition represents an attempt to prevent police records from being
transmitted to the FBI unless specifically requested or to employers, rather
than attempting to directly prevent dissemination by the FBI of rap sheet
information to non-law enforcement activities.
Although constitutional grounds are relied upon, it is doubtful that the
court will go further than the Duncan ordinance to give the requested relief,
since that ordinance specifically prohibits the District of Columbia Police
Department from transmitting arrest records to another law enforcement
agency, unless that agency has specifically requested the record and repre-
sents that it is investigating the person named in the arrest record.30
Although the Duncan ordinance prohibits the police department from giv-
ing the records in question to non-law enforcement agencies, some of
these agencies are authorized recipients of the same FBI rap sheets. By
such circumvention, the spirit of the Duncan ordinance has been violated.
In addition, the FBI apparently receives District of Columbia Police records in
bulk rather than on requests for specific individual's records as required by
the Duncan ordinance. As the court in Menard stated:
A government agency may not escape responsibility for improper
use of material disseminated by it simply because the improper use
is not mandatory and is in fact made by a third party.31
Unfortunately, neither court fully discussed the possible constitutional is-
sues involved, despite the fact that they explicitly recognized their presence.
However, it is evident from the concern that both courts showed for the possi-
ble ill effects on an individual's employment, education and other endeavors,
that the constitutional questions which deserve discussion are due process
and the right to privacy as embodied by the fourth, fifth, and ninth amend-
ments. The remainder of this article will address itself to the above issues,
followed by a critique of the present record-keeping system.
Denial of Property Without Due Process of Law
Both the fifth and fourteenth amendments state that no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.3 2 This guar-
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this
rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
30. See note 27, supra.
31. 430 F.2d 486, 492 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also National Student Ass'n v.
Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
32. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
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anty has been described as the very essence of ordered justice,a3 and that in
its absence the right of private property could not exist in the sense known to
our laws. 34  The primary purpose of the due process clause is to insure
fair and orderly administration of law. 35  It was not designed to interfere
with the power of federal or state governments to protect the lives, liberty,
and property of its citizens or with the exercise of that power in the ad-
ministration of the legal process.
3 6
33. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 428 (1953). In a state criminal prose-
cution on motion of the prosecutor, a mistrial was declared when two witnesses on
whom the state based its case refused to testify under the self incrimination section of
the fifth amendment. In a second trial for the same offense, the same defendant was
convicted. It was held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was
not violated, since it was in the interest of justice that the first trial was terminated.
The Court based its decision in part on a test announced in Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a
hardship so acute and shocking that our policy will not endure it? Does it
violate those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions"? . . The answer must surely be
"no."
Id. at 328. The Palko approach to basic constitutional law has, however, been rejected.
See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See generally Farrar, Double
leopardy and Due Process, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 531 (1969).
34. Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 161 (1913). A provision in
the judicial order of General Henry during the United States military occupation of
Puerto Rico which retroactively reduced the period for prescriptive title to real estate
previously set by law was held to be a deprivation of property without due process of
law.
35. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The business
activities of an out of state corporation within a state provided sufficient contacts or
ties to make it reasonable, just, and in harmony with the due process requirements of
the fourteenth amendment to make the corporation amenable to suits within the
state:
Whether due process is satisfied must depend . . . upon the quality and
nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
Id. at 319. See, e.g., Frankfurter, Memorandum on "incorporation" of the Bill of
Rights into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARv. L. REV.
746 (1965).
36. In Re Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 632 (1891). It was held that the State of Mich-
igan had the power to protect the property rights of its citizens by imposing criminal
penalties for violations of those rights. A conviction on an embezzlement charge was
upheld as within the state's jurisdiction and as a proper administration of criminal jus-
tice consistent with the fourteenth amendment. The Court in Howard v. Kentucky,
200 U.S. 164 (1906), attempted to illuminate the mandates of the fourteenth amend-
ment:
The provision of the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, having brought
within the Federal jurisdiction and power the protection against state action,
the judicial power of the Nation necessarily extends thereto; and it is not
requisite for jurisdiction that the right or thing claimed come from the law of
the United States; though it comes from the state law, it is protected from
unlawful state action. It must not be so construed, however, as to interfere
with the State in its enactment and local administration of the criminal law, nor
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The fact that a person may not be hired or admitted to school because of
the adverse criminal record which the FBI maintains constitutes a denial of
liberty and property. While it might be contended that these records are
only circulated to governmental agencies, the recent regulation published by
the Attorney General contradicts such an inference.37  Even if the records
are restricted to only federal government agencies, this might cause a person
to be denied a job should he apply to one of these agencies. The reluctance
of employers-both governmental and private-to hire persons with criminal
records enhances the argument that if the FBI maintains criminal identifica-
tion files, they must be accurate and clearly reflect the final disposition of
the case prior to release to other agencies.
The importance of indicating the final disposition on the rap sheet is illus-
trated by a recent incident in New York. In 1969 New York passed a stat-
ute requiring all employees of securities firms fingerprinted and providing
that the fingerprints should be sent to the state's Attorney General "for ap-
propriate processing."' 3s  Several hundred employees, who submitted them-
selves for fingerprinting, were found to have criminal records. Shortly there-
after they were dismissed from their employment. 39  The resultant injustice
was that over half of those fired had no conviction records, rather only ar-
rest records.40  The New York State Identification and Intelligence
System is authorized to receive information from the FBI under the federal
statute providing for dissemination of such records, 41 but for some unknown
reason the information was made available to the employer by that agency.
to confine it to any special mode of proceeding, so long as said law, as en-
forced by the State, affords equal protection to all persons within its juris-
diction, similarly situated, and is not violative of the fundamental and inalien-
able rights that are essential to the protection of life, liberty and property.
Id. at 165-66.
37. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1970).
38. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-e(12) (McKinney Supp. 1970):
All persons including partners, officers, directors and salesmen employed
by a member or a member organization of a National Security Exchange, reg-
istered with the federal securities exchange commission and any employee of a
clearing corporation affiliated with any such registered National Security
Exchange employed on or after September first, nineteen hundred sixty-nine,
who are regularly employed within the State of New York shall, as a
condition of employment, be fingerprinted. Every set of fingerprints taken pur-
suant to this subdivision shall be promptly submitted to the attorney general
for appropriate processing. The department of law shall collect from a mem-
ber or member organization of a national security exchange or a clearing
corporation affiliated with any such registered national security exchange sub-
mitting fingerprints to the attorney general for processing a fee of five dollars
for each set of fingerprints submitted.
39. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1970, at 1, col. 2; Wall Street J., Feb. 5, 1970, at 17, col. 3.
40. Id.
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1970).
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One may reasonably conclude that the federal statute, which calls for cancel-
lation of an agency's privilege to receive such information upon unauthorized
dissemination, is either not mandatory or not enforced. Certainly, it is argu-
able that those employees fired based on their arrest records were denied
property without due process of law. Concededly, the state has an obliga-
tion to protect the lives, liberty, and property of its citizens. However, it
seems unreasonable that the states' interests require an employee's dismissal
on the basis of a mere arrest record, especially since the employee was even-
tually exonerated. It cannot be said that a legally innocent man, i.e., one
not convicted, is a danger to another citizen or the community.
An effect of due process is to prevent the governmental taking of one per-
son's property and transferring it to another, contrary to settled concepts
and usages of procedure, without notice and opportunity for a hearing. 42
A statutory attempt to accomplish such a change of ownership would be
considered a violation of due process which could not be defended as a
proper exercise of police power.48  By allowing the rap sheet to be dissemi-
nated to the various agencies described by the new regulation, 44 the statute
places the guaranty in a perilous position. The power to deny a person his
rightful employment is indeed a dangerous weapon, and the situation should
be closely analyzed before used. As illustrated in this section many em-
ployees have lost their jobs, simply because of adverse criminal arrest rec-
ords. As stated in Morrow v. District of Columbia:
45
The main evil produced by dissemination of arrest records thus
seems to be the adverse effect on job opportunity. To this extent,
it appears that the Duncan Report rules would be a good rule of
thumb as to the appropriate scope of a court order prohibiting dis-
semination of arrest records. However, other evils, such as un-
justified invasion of privacy, particularly where innocent persons
are arrested, may result from such dissemination in particular
42. Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 161 (1913).
43. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (employment of the
police power of a state to violate a citizen's right to marital privacy deemed unconsti-
tutional); Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 376-77, 140 N.W. 615, 620-21 (1913)
(a Michigan statute providing that the owner of a motor vehicle is liable for any
injury caused by negligent operation thereof by any person unless the vehicle is stolen
was held to be unconstitutional as depriving the owner of his property without due
process of law. Since the statute renders an owner liable for damages caused by a
mere stranger or a willful trespasser, it is not a proper exercise of the state's police
power). See also Burdick v. People, 149 Ill. 600, 601, 36 N.E. 948, 949-51 (1894) (a
state statute allowing only certified brokers to sell railroad and steamship tickets was up-
held as a reasonable and proper exercise of a state's police power since the purpose
of the statute was to prevent frauds upon travelers).
44. 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1970).
45. 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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cases, indicating the possible need for a flexible rather than a fixed
rule.46
The problem is heightened when a person is the victim of a mass arrest, is
never prosecuted, and loses a job because of an arrest record which does
not reflect the subsequent exoneration. A statute permitting such results is
constitutionally suspect.
Privacy and the FBI Rap Sheet
In 1890 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published an article strongly
advocating a right to privacy which should be protected by the courts. 47
By carefully tracing prior case law allowing recovery under the principles of
defamation, property rights, and breach of confidence and contract, the two
authors argued that in reality it was privacy that the courts were protecting. 48
By their article, they attempted to convince the courts that a doctrine of pri-
vacy would be the most appropriate way to resolve cases of disclosure of
private information. Gradually, the courts began to follow the suggestion
of the article, and in some instances cited it as precedent. 49 Today, the pro-
tection of privacy has been divided into four basic areas: (1) protection
against the intrusion into the private affairs of an individual; (2) protec-
tion against public disclosure of embarrassing private facts concerning an
individual; (3) protection against publicity which places an individual in a
false light; and (4) protection against the appropriation of an individual's
name or likeness for money. 50 The first two areas are the most relevant to
the privacy problem with regard to the maintenance of FBI rap sheets.
In early cases the protection against intrusion was directed only toward
physical intrusion or physical searches of an individual's person. As a result
the protection was only an extention of the tort principles of trespass.
Eventually, the protection was held to encompass various types of sensory
intrusion, such as peering at individuals through windows, eavesdropping and
wiretapping. 51 In Zimmerman v. Wilson,52 the intrusion doctrine was ex-
tended to the area of personal records. Zimmerman held that an unau-
thorized prying into the plaintiff's bank records constituted a wrongful inva-
46. Id. at 742.
47. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
48. Id. at 195-200.
49. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.6 (1967); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (1965).
50. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALiF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
51. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967); Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 981 (1966).
52. 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936), modified, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939).
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sion of his privacy. 3 This case received subsequent disapproval by Judge
Learned Hand in McMann v. SEC.54  Although Zimmerman was not ex-
pressly over-ruled in McMann it consistently has been held to be restricted
to its facts. Because of the technological advances in eavesdropping and
surveillance, the concern for protection of privacy has increased. Since the
Constitution does not expressly provide a right to privacy, the legislature and
courts have interpreted it in a way that affords protection from an
invasion of privacy by government agents. Unrestrained searches and
seizures,55  surreptitious eavesdropping, 56  and wiretapping, 57 compelled
submissions to lie detector tests,5" and truth drugs 9 are all examples of
violations of an individual's interest in the integrity of his person. It is ar-
gued that since the above methods of obtaining information are without per-
sonal consent, they constitute violations of his right to privacy even though
the information obtained is not such that he particularly cares whether it is
kept secret. In recent years the interests of privacy have received increased
constitutional protection against even the most common invasions.60
53. Id. at 849.
54. 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1937).
55. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
56. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
57. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
58. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 345 U.S. 449 (1957).
59. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
60. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) where a conviction over-
turned since some of the evidence was obtained in violation of the petitioner's fourth
amendment rights of privacy and freedom from unwarranted searches and seizures.
FBI agents obtained the illegal evidence by a non-penetrating electronic listening and
recording device attached to the outside of a public telephone booth. The right to
privacy in a public telephone booth was held to include the right to exclude the "un-
invited ear," since one entering such a place expects to be seen but not to be heard by
outsiders. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) the court reversed a
conviction based on a San Francisco statute providing criminal punishment for re-
fusing to permit warrantless administrative searches. The Court held that the public
purpose of the inspection ordinance did not outweigh the rights guaranteed by the
fourth amendment. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) a Connecticut
statute making it a crime for any person to use any drug or device to prevent conception
was held to contravene the fourteenth amendment and the constitutional right to pri-
vacy. The right to marital privacy was held to be within the penumbra of specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. In Giancana v. Johnson, Civil No. 63 C 1145 (N.D.
Ill. July 22, 1963), the plaintiff was under twenty-four hour surveillance by the FBI.
FBI agents observed him at his home and followed him as he went about his private
affairs including going to places of public accommodation such as restaurants, stores
and golf courses. Judge Austin of the district court granted a preliminary injunction
limiting the methods of surveillance used by the FBI agents based on plaintiff's right to
privacy under the fourth and fifth amendments.
Four days after the temporary injunction was issued by Judge Austin, the Seventh
Circuit stayed the order. Giancana v. Hoover, 322 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1963). The
court did so because "[a] failure of jurisdiction appears on the face of the amended
complaint." Moreover there was no allegation that plaintiff was damaged in an amount
exceeding $10,000 as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964). "Defendants ... are a
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The question remains whether the maintenance of the rap sheet infringes
on the right to privacy. To fully appreciate the concept of a right to privacy,
one should consider the opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut.61 Justice
Douglas, speaking for the majority, stated:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of associa-
tion contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as
we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against
the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without
the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The
Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detri-
ment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."'62
The fact that Griswold applied the right to privacy to a new zone, i.e., the
marital relationship, supports the argument that there are other zones of pri-
vacy which need protection. In discussing the reason for the inclusion of the
ninth amendment in the Constitution, Justice Goldberg stated in his concur-
ing opinion:
It was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically
enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all es-
sential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would
be interpreted as a denial that others were protected. 63
The draftsmen could not have anticipated the existence of a criminal record
system, as developed by the FBI, and could not, therefore, foresee the possi-
part of the executive department of the United States and they are not subject to super-
vision or direction by the courts as to how they shall perform the duties imposed by
law upon them .... [Otherwise there] would be an unwarranted interference and in-
trusion upon the discretion vested in this case, for instances, in the director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation." Id. at 790.
The injunctive order of the District Court was reversed in a subsequent hearing on
the ground that the lower court lacked jurisdiction because of the requirement of an
allegation of $10,000 damages. Giancana v. Johnson, 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964).
In his dissent, Judge Swygert stated:
It is incongruous to hold that a formal allegation of the amount in con-
troversy is necessary when personal liberties of the magnitude alleged in the
complaint and found by the district court are involved. To require a dollar
value to be specifically averred in these circumstances is to exalt form over
substance. . . . [T]he district court could infer, contrary to what the majority
indicates, that the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000.
Id. at 371.
61. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. Id. at 484.
63. Id. at 488-89,
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ble violations of an individual's rights. The clear intention of the ninth
amendment is to act as a "catch-all" provision in order to protect unenumer-
ated rights which might be subject to government infringement.
Whether the FBI rap sheet falls within a protected zone of privacy de-
pends on whether it is a public or private document, and the importance of
maintaining and disseminating these records in the public interest. Generally,
governmental records whose accessibility are not legislatively restricted are
considered public, and not protected from disclosure. Such records as birth
certificates, military service records, court testimony, police measurements
and fingerprints which are maintained for administrative reasons fall within
this category. However, government records that are considered confiden-
tial or which have access restrictions, are usually classified as private. The
FBI rap sheet and tax and census records fall within this category and are
protected from public disclosure. As we previously discussed, there is some
question as to the extent of protection against public disclosure afforded the
rap sheet. The restrictions are apparently insufficient, since there is evi-
dence that employers have gained access to these documents.
64
Admittedly, there are situations where the public interest requires that the
individual's right to keep personal information private must be supplanted.
The reasonable exercise of the police power, which includes fingerprinting
and other record-taking, is one of these situations.6 5 The courts and legis-
latures have had to wrestle with the problem of balancing the value of pri-
vacy against other social values. Every attempt is made to maximize both
values. Menard and Penney provide excellent examples of courts attempting
to salvage a valuable system for maintaining criminal records, while protecting
the individual against the adverse use of his record.
Conclusion
Clearly, the FBI rap sheet serves a valuable function in criminal investiga-
tion. It provides a centralized source of information on those arrested for
crime and a record of their fingerprints. The main problems with these rec-
ords arise from their incompleteness and dissemination. The records are in-
complete to the extent they do not always contain a final disposition. As
previously described, every year a large number of persons guilty of no
criminal activity are arrested and charged with crimes. Some have un-
justly acquired arrest records "without even the excuse of an honest and un-
avoidable mistake by the police." 6 6 Mass arrests during demonstrations and
64. See, e.g., text accompanying note 37 supra.
65. See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950).
66. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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dragnet arrests further illustrate situations where innocent bystanders are
subject to arrest. The court in Menard described how in the District of Co-
lumbia thousands of persons had been once arrested for investigation and
then released, but that their records often remained on file.67 Unless the FBI
receives notfication of a final disposition, the record will continue to reflect
only the arrest. 68  The absence of a final disposition is a persuasive reason
to protest the wide dissemination of rap sheets, especially if it is made avail-
able to prospective employers or schools.
It is suggested that the FBI severely curtail the availability of rap sheets to
private parties and governmental agencies other than those directly involved
in law enforcement. The incompleteness of the records necessitates such a
restriction. The tendency by non-law enforcement agencies to misconstrue
the contents of the rap sheet and to place emphasis on mere arrests instead
of convictions supports such a restriction. If the FBI renovates its present
system to provide for the updating of its records and permits only those rec-
ords which are complete, i.e., for every arrest the record shows a disposition
to be disseminated to other agencies, then it is arguable that the individual's
rights are sufficiently protected. Even after such renovation, the FBI should
be extremely cautious when circulating these records to other governmental
agencies, and it should be certain to scrutinize each individual request for the
rap sheets. The implementation of such a controlled system is necessary to
maintain the balance between the individual's privacy and due process of in-
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537
The following FBI record, NUMBER , is furnished FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY. Information shown on this Identification Record represents data furnished FBI
by fingerprint contributors. WHERE FINAL DISPOSITION IS NOT SHOWN OR
FURTHER EXPLANATION OF CHARGE IS DESIRED, COMMUNICATE WITH
AGENCY CONTRIBUTING THOSE FINGERPRINTS.
Contributor of Name and Number Received Charge Disposition
Fingerprints Arrested or
Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints in FBI files but are listed only
as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this record.
John Edgar Hoover
Director
